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Articles
Child abuse allegations in family law
cases: A review of the law*
Richard Chisholm†
This article examines M v M and the more important later decisions relating
to parenting cases in which there are allegations of child abuse, discussing
John Fogarty’s criticisms of certain Full Court decisions and his call for a
‘return to basics’. It suggests that some comments by the Full Court need to
be treated with caution, and argues that the law requires courts to make a
balanced assessment of the relevant considerations, not only when deciding
what parenting orders to make, but also when deciding what positive or
negative findings to make about allegations of child abuse.
1 Introduction
Sadly, it is an everyday occurrence for the family law courts to hear cases in
which there are allegations of sexual and other forms of abuse against
children. The modern law on the topic starts with the High Court’s decision in
M v M,1 a decision now over 20 years old which has been applied and
interpreted in numerous later cases. In an important article in 2006,2 John
Fogarty argued that some of the Full Court decisions contained misleading or
faulty analysis, and he urged ‘a return to basics’.
This article reviews M v M and the more important decisions3 in the later
case law (including Fogarty’s critique), and seeks to clarify the current legal
principles. It will be argued that the substance of Fogarty’s critique of some
Full Court statements is correct, and it follows that those statements should be
treated with caution.
This topic seems particularly important because the principles laid down by
the High Court can apply to areas other than child sexual abuse. Sexual abuse
cases are distinctive, of course: sexual abuse can be very damaging to the
child, and the allegation is particularly shocking; and because it usually
happens in private, the evidence is typically circumstantial and often
ambiguous. Despite these special features, the general principles expressed in
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August 2009.
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1 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 12 Fam LR 612; FLC 91-979; 82 ALR 577.
2 J Fogarty AM, ‘Unacceptable risk — A return to basics’ (2006) 20 AJFL 249.
3 For a valuable and more detailed review of the case law, see R Harris, ‘Failing the
vulnerable: shortcomings in the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility)
Act 2006 (Cth) and the “Unacceptable Risk” Test’, LLM Minor Thesis, Melbourne
University Law School, 2009.
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M v M can be applied to other areas.4 Further, the principles are applicable not
only to the work of the family law courts but also to the work of children’s
courts.5
This article does not engage in a detailed discussion of the impact of the
amendments of 2006.6 There are reasons for thinking that those amendments
may not have made a great deal of difference to the principles applied by the
courts in child abuse cases.7 First, there seems no indication in the reasoning
in the case law that they have caused a significant change: the cases continue
to treat M v M as setting out the applicable approach, while, of course,
applying the criteria as formulated in the 2006 amendments. Second, a recent
study of a sample of decisions found ‘no discernible difference’ in the way the
application of the ‘unacceptable risk’ test was applied in decisions before and
after the amendments.8 Third, the amendments of 2006 do not include any
provisions specifically relating to child abuse cases, but give great emphasis
to the two considerations that often compete, namely, the child’s need for
protection and the benefit the child might have from parental involvement.9
Both of these, of course, were also taken into account in the pre-2006 law; and
giving added emphasis to both of them would not seem likely to tip the scales
one way or the other. Further research may, however, shed more light on the
nature and extent of any impact the amendments might have made on child
abuse cases.
Finally, as this article went to press the Attorney-General released draft
legislation,10 and the Australian Law Reform Commission and the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission released a major report,11 related to family
violence and child abuse. While it has not been possible to examine the
question in detail, it seems likely that the principles in M v M will remain
4 The expression has been incorporated into the Family Law Act 1975, which requires the
court to ensure that an order ‘does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family
violence’: s 60CG, noted by Fogarty, above n 2, at 257. It has been applied to psychological
abuse: Orwell & Watson [2008] FamCAFC 62; BC200850122 per Dessau J. It has been used
in proceedings under the parens patriae jurisdiction of the NSW Supreme Court, in the
context of deciding whether there should be intervention into an intact family to protect the
children: Re Frieda and Geoffrey (2009) 40 Fam LR 608; [2009] NSWSC 133;
BC200901594 at [71]ff; Re Jayden [2007] NSWCA 35; BC200701138 at [79]. It has even
popped up in relation to bail (an unacceptable risk that the prisoner would commit a serious
sexual offence): Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; 210 ALR 50;
[2004] HCA 46; BC200406384, cited by Fogarty, above n 2, at 249.
5 R Chisholm, ‘The law on unacceptable risk — a comparison of the family law and care
jurisdictions’, forthcoming in the NSW Children’s Court’s online publication ‘Children’s
Law News’.
6 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006.
7 It is a different question, of course, how the amendments have affected people’s
understanding of the law. This important question is not the subject of this article. It is
considered in a number of reports currently available from the website of the
Attorney-General’s Department, including The Australian Institute of Family Studies’,
Evaluation of the 2006 family law reforms (December 2009) and Richard Chisholm, Family
Courts Violence Review (November 2009).
8 Harris, above n 3, at 65–6.
9 See especially Family Law Act ss 60B and 60CC(2).
10 Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010 (released 11 November 2010).
11 Family Violence — A National Legal Response, ALRC Report 114, released 11 November
2010.
2 (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 9 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Mar 22 14:30:58 2011
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol25pt1/part_1
important even if there are legislative changes of the kind foreshadowed in
those developments.
2 M v M: An overview
The facts and the decision12
In M v M13 the mother suspected that the father had sexually abused the
parties’ 4 year old daughter, because of things the child told her. She took the
child for examination, but it was inconclusive, and the child then made no
disclosures. The child did later make disclosures to a police officer, albeit after
leading questioning by the mother and the officer. She also implicated the
father in sexual abuse in later interviews with a child psychologist, who
believed that the child had been abused, although not necessarily by the father.
The mother, it seems, genuinely believed that the allegations were true. The
father denied them.
The trial Judge said he was unable to determine whether or not the father
had abused the child, but thought there was a possibility that the child had
been abused by the father, and terminated access by the father. His Honour
ruled out supervised access as not having any benefit for the child, but that
aspect was not the subject of the appeal.
The majority of the Full Court dismissed the father’s appeal, although
Nicholson CJ, dissenting, held that access should not be refused because of a
mere possibility that access would expose the child to a risk of sexual abuse
— there must be ‘a real or substantial risk of such abuse occurring as a matter
of practical reality’.
The High Court dismissed the father’s appeal in a single unanimous
judgment. Although the trial Judge had used the term ‘lingering doubts’, the
High Court agreed with the majority of the Full Court that on a correct reading
of his judgment, he had found that ‘as a matter of practical reality’, access
would have entailed a risk that the child might be sexually abused and her
welfare endangered. In those circumstances, the High Court, like the majority
of the Full Court, upheld the trial judgment.
The High Court thought that the difference of opinion in the Full Court
might have reflected different views about what the judge had decided. In
dissent, Nicholson CJ had formulated a test that included the words ‘as a
matter of practical reality’, and on the High Court’s interpretation of the trial
judgment, it would have passed the Nicholson test. This is important, because
it emphasises the point, to which I will return, that the High Court did not say
that any possible risk is enough.
12 Valuable discussions of M v M and its implications include The Hon Chief Justice Alastair
Nicholson, ‘Child sexual abuse — problems in family law’ (1989) 4 Australian Family
Lawyer 1; Family Law Council, Child Sexual Abuse, AGPS, Canberra, 1988); and three
articles by P Parkinson: ‘Unacceptable Risks and the Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse
(1990) 4 AJFL 254; ‘Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in the Family Court’ (1990) 4 AJFL
60), and ‘Family Law and Parent-Child Contact: assessing the risk of sexual abuse’ (1999)
23 MULR 345.
13 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 12 Fam LR 612; FLC 91-979; 82 ALR 577.
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The father’s submission and why it was rejected
To understand the decision, it is important to identify the argument that was
addressed to the High Court. The appellant father argued in the High Court
that in such cases the court must first determine, on the balance of
probabilities, whether the parent has abused the child. If the complainant fails
on that issue, that is the end of the matter because the rejection of the
complaint necessarily entails a negative answer to the second issue, which is
whether there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if the access order is made.
It is quite clear, in my view, that the father’s submission was untenable.
Evidence that a person has previously abused the child would indeed strongly
suggest that the child would be at risk if placed in the care of the person. But
it is not necessary for a finding of risk. There could well be evidence of a risk
of child sexual abuse other than evidence that the accused person had
previously abused the child. The person could have abused other children, the
house could be full of child pornography, the person could have been
grooming the child, even boasting about his intentions to abuse the child, and
so on. This sort of evidence could easily lead to a finding that the child would
be at risk of abuse in the care of the person. And it would make no difference,
of course, if it had also been alleged that the person had actually abused the
child in question, but the court was unable to make that finding: the other
evidence could still lead to a finding that the child was at risk of abuse.
Less obviously, although a finding that the person had previously abused
the child would strongly suggest a future risk, there could be evidence that
would lead the court not to make the finding of risk. Suppose, for example,
that there was good evidence that the previous abuse had occurred when the
person was mentally ill, and the illness was now cured or controlled by
medication. More obviously, the question is always whether the proposed
orders would expose the child to risk, and the court might well be persuaded
that a particular order, such as an order for supervised contact, would not
involve a risk of sexual abuse.
Thus, the father’s submission could not possibly succeed. A finding that the
person had previously abused the child is not a necessary condition for a
finding that orders placing the child with that person would expose the child
to risk of abuse. Nor is it a suffıcient condition for such a finding of risk,
because there could be circumstances that lead the court to conclude that even
though the person had previously abused the child, the proposed orders would
not expose the child to risk.
It’s not surprising, then, that the High Court rejected the submission,
essentially for these reasons. Here is what it said:
The fact that the proceedings involve an allegation that the child has been sexually
abused by the parent who seeks custody or access does not alter the paramount and
ultimate issue which the court has to determine, though the court’s findings on the
disputed allegation of sexual abuse will naturally have an important, perhaps a
decisive, impact on the resolution of that issue . . . the resolution of an allegation of
sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the court’s
determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
As this passage shows, there are two separate questions about which findings
might be made: (1) whether the person seeking to have contact with the child
4 (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Family Law
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previously abused the child and (2) whether the proposed contact orders
expose the child to such a risk of abuse that they should not be made. We will
take them in turn. In relation to the first, the court discussed when such a
finding could be made, and when it might be appropriate to make such a
finding. In relation to the second, the court laid down the ‘unacceptable risk’
principle.
Findings that a person has sexually abused the child:
when can they be made?
As to the determination of sexual abuse allegations, there were no surprises:
those allegations were to be determined ‘according to the civil standard of
proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw’.14 This
basically remains the position, although as we will see it is now necessary to
bring the test up to date by reference to later cases and to the Evidence Act
1995.
Findings that a person has sexually abused the child:
when should they be made?
The court made two comments on this question. First, it acknowledged that
the evidence will often fall short of what is required to make such a finding:
No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive
finding that the allegation is well-founded . . . there will be very many cases, such
as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual
abuse has taken place.
The court also commented on whether, in circumstances where the evidence
would justify a finding that a person has abused the child, the court should, in
fact, make that finding:
And there are strong practical family reasons why the court should refrain from
making a positive finding that sexual abuse has actually taken place unless it is
impelled by the particular circumstances of the case to do so.
Making parenting orders: the unacceptable risk test
The High Court then went on to say something about the assessment of risk
of sexual abuse, and laid down the famous test of ‘unacceptable risk’, which
relates to the making of what are now called parenting orders. The key passage
starts:
In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there
is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assessing the
magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child,
the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or
possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a
detrimental impact on the child’s welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk
14 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362; [1938] ALR 334; (1938) 12 ALJR 100;
BC3800027.
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of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a
fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access
. . .
The court then referred to various earlier attempts to formulate a helpful test,
such as ‘risk of serious harm’, or ‘an appreciable risk’, but said those formulas
were ‘striving for a greater degree of definition than the subject is capable of
yielding’. The court concluded:
In devising these tests the courts have endeavoured, in their efforts to protect the
child’s paramount interests, to achieve a balance between the risk of detriment to the
child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental
access. To achieve a proper balance, the test is best expressed by saying that a court
will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose
the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse.
The principles stated
It is not difficult to identify the principles emerging from M v M. In a valuable
article published shortly after the decision,15 the former Chief Justice of the
Family Court, Alistair Nicholson, expressed them accurately and succinctly:
(a) It is [not] necessary to make a positive finding of child abuse and the court
should avoid doing so except in the most obvious cases.16
(b) If such a finding is made, the standard of proof to be apply is that provided
in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.
(c) In resolving the issue as to what form of order is in the best interests of the
child, the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of
abuse occuring if custody or access be granted and assessing the magnitude
of that risk.
(d) If the risk is assessed to be unacceptable, then custody or access should not
be granted.
3 The Re W decisions
The present review of the later case law starts with three decisions which were
particularly criticised by John Fogarty, and which I will for convenience call
‘the Re W decisions’.17
K v B (1994)
In K v B,18 the majority (Ellis and Baker JJ) dismissed an appeal from a
judgment in which the trial Judge, applying Briginshaw, had found that
unsupervised contact would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual
abuse, and that supervised contact would not be in the child’s interests (mainly
15 Nicholson, above n 12, at 3.
16 Nicholson actually wrote ‘[i]t is no longer necessary . . .’. I have modified the phrasing only
to simply the matter by removing the implication that under the previous law it had been
necessary to make such a finding. I don’t think that is so, but the point is not worth pursuing
here.
17 The decisions are K v B (1994) 17 Fam LR 722; (1994) FLC 92-478; WK v SR (1997) 22
Fam LR 592; (1997) FLC 92-787, and Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof (2004) 32 Fam
LR 249; FLC 93-192; [2004] FamCA 768.
18 K v B (1994) 17 Fam LR 722; (1994) FLC 92-478.
6 (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 13 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Mar 22 14:30:58 2011
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol25pt1/part_1
because there was no suitable supervisor). Both the trial judgment and the
majority judgments are, in my view, orthodox and unremarkable. Kay J’s
dissent, however, requires comment because it has played a part in later
developments.
After introductory comments, Kay J’s dissenting judgment contains an
extended discussion of the importance of access, with numerous citations,
including judicial quotations, an article of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and a pamphlet entitled ‘Parents are Forever’. His conclusions are firm:
In my view the denial of an opportunity of a relationship between the child and his
father is a conclusion which the court should only reach with the utmost reluctance
. . .19
In my view where there exists a meaningful relationship with parent and child it will
only be in exceptional circumstances that the courts should actively prohibit the
continuance of that relationship in some form or another.20
At one point in this wide-ranging discussion, Kay J returned to the trial
judgment, making the following comment:
Faced with a possibility of inappropriate sexual conduct towards the child of a
sexual nature and faced with the custodial parent’s firm belief that such conduct took
place, in my view it was not unreasonable for his Honour to have concluded that
unsupervised access was inappropriate in the circumstances.
The word ‘inappropriate’ is an insufficient account of the trial Judge’s
findings. The trial Judge did not merely say that it was inappropriate, but
based his conclusion on an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse:
Looking at the evidence as a whole, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that
there is an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in giving the husband unsupervised
access, and that it would not be in the best interests of the child to make an order
to that effect.21
Kay J upheld the appeal essentially because he held that the trial Judge could
not properly have concluded that that supervised access would not be of any
benefit to the child.22 He did not say that the trial Judge was not entitled to find
that there was an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in giving the husband
unsupervised access. Yet although it was therefore not relevant to the appeal,
Kay J went on to speak at length of the dangers of wrongly believing that a
child has been abused:23
. . . Can the welfare of a child be advanced by denying it a relationship with its non
custodial parent on the basis that at its highest, the trial Judge is left with the
possibility that some sort of sexual misbehaviour might have occurred between the
father and his 2½ year old child, particularly in circumstances where the child is
closely bonded to the father and enjoys an excellent relationship with him?
19 Ibid, at Fam LR 743.
20 Ibid, at Fam LR 746.
21 The trial Judge went on to say that the mother’s unshakeable belief that the father had
abused the child was another factor that led him to the view that he should not make an order
for unsupervised access.
22 K v B (1994) 17 Fam LR 722 at 743; (1994) FLC 92-478.
23 Ibid, at Fam LR 749.
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In my view the legal system is brought into disrepute if the mere existence of a
possible threat to a child is sufficient to disrupt the relationship between parent and
child . . .
We do not require that before a person is entrusted with the care of a child, that
person positively prove that they will take all possible steps to minimise any risk to
the child whatsoever . . .
Why is it in access cases where there is an allegation of sexual abuse, the failure
to negate the allegation is often seen as an appropriate basis for denying the child a
relationship with its parent?
These comments, with respect, are misleading. It was not the law that the
‘possibility’ of ‘some sort of sexual misbehaviour’, or ‘there mere existence of
a possible threat’, or the failure to negate an abuse allegation, were appropriate
grounds on which to deny the child a relationship with a parent. As we have
seen, the High Court’s test, which had been properly applied by the trial Judge
(as Kay J in effect conceded) is that orders should not be made that would
expose the child to an unacceptable risk of abuse. Nor did Kay J offer any
evidence that in practice in Australia the failure to negate the allegation was
‘often seen as an appropriate basis for denying the child a relationship with its
parent’. The comments were also unnecessary, because the only real
difference between Kay J and the majority was on a fairly narrow point,
namely, whether there had been evidence to support the trial Judge’s
conclusion that supervised access was not in the child’s best interests (the
main problem being the lack of anyone the trial Judge thought was a suitable
supervisor).
Although as Fogarty points out these views were not referred to in the next
two Full Court decisions (which followed M v M in an orthodox way),24 some
of Kay J’s extended discussion about the benefits of access and the dangers of
false conclusions about sexual abuse was adopted in the later decision Re W,
as we shall see.
Reliance on a 1992 article by Horner et al
A further notable aspect of the judgement is its reliance on a published
article,25 from which Kay J quoted.26 There are, with respect, a number of
problems with his Honour’s use of this article. First, there is no indication that
the parties’ representatives were given an opportunity to make submissions on
it. Second, there is no reference to the standing of the authors, or the level of
24 Unreported, Ellis, Baker and Finn JJ, 14 July 1995; D v M (unreported, Baker, Lindenmayer
and Smithers JJ, 10 October 1996).
25 T M Horner, M J Guyer and N M Kalter, ‘Prediction, Prevention and Clinical Expertise in
Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: III.
Studies of Expert Opinion Formation’ (1992) XXVI(2) Family Law Quarterly 141. This
quoted article is the third of a set of three, by authors qualified in psychology. The first is
T M Horner and M J Guyer, ‘Prediction, Prevention and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody
Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: I Predictable Rates of
Diagnostic Error in Relation to Various Clinical Decisionmaking Strategies’ (1991-1992) 25
Fam LQ 217. The second is T M Horner and M J Guyer, ‘Prediction, Prevention and Clinical
Expertise in Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been
Made: II Prevalence Rates of Child Sexual Abuse and the Precision of “Tests” Constructed
to Diagnose It’ (1991-1992) 25 Fam LQ 381.
26 K v B (1994) 17 Fam LR 722 at 748–9; (1994) FLC 92-478.
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acceptance of their views among other scholars in the field. John Fogarty
wrote: ‘In the wide spectrum of opinions about expert evidence this article
occupies an extreme position. But it is hardly the last word. You could fill a
library with articles on this topic arriving at differing conclusions.’27
Third, and most importantly, the article is not primarily about judicial
decision-making at all. It is mainly about the reliability or otherwise of
clinical decisions. As Brown J has pointed out in the course of a valuable and
detailed critique (regrettably unreported but reproduced in the Appendix to
this article):
[The authors’] main point is that the court should be cautious when considering
expert evidence; as its sub-title makes clear, the article is about the formation of
expert opinion, not determination of allegations by a court.
Brown J also pointed out that there are two significant omissions from the
passages quoted by Kay J. The first omission is of the introductory sentence,
which is as follows:
Clinicians seem inherently averse to both the scientific standard of accepting the null
hypothesis (and, correlatively, the legal standard of presuming innocence in the
absence of incriminating proof) when adduced data are insufficient to make its
rejection defensible.28
The second omission29 is as follows (the words omitted by Kay J are in
italics):
Unfortunately, the magnetising force of the simple allegation of a heinous event such
as child sexual abuse, which legitimately invokes consideration of the possibility of
that event, draws the clinician — and perhaps even judges and jurors as well,
although the safeguards against this happening seem to us stronger in the civil arena
than in the clinical arena — away from what ought always to be the starting point
of his or her evaluation enquiries, which is that the event did not (or very highly
probably did not) occur.30
The omission of these words is particularly unfortunate. Like the missing
introductory sentence, the omitted words underline that the authors’ main
concern — and their qualifications — relate to clinical judgment. Indeed, the
omitted words indicate that the authors appear to have more confidence in the
judicial process in civil law cases (‘the civil arena’) than in the ‘clinical
arena’. These omissions, and the way the article is used in Kay J’s judgment,
might give readers the false impression that the article contained research
indicating that courts are likely to make false findings that children have been
abused. Unfortunately, as we will see, a later Full Court appeared to rely
uncritically on Kay J’s summary of the article (Re W, below).
27 Fogarty, above n 2, at 272.
28 Horner et al, above n 25, at 170.
29 Kay J’s quotation from the article, quite properly, did indicate (by ‘. . .’) that some words had
been omitted; the criticism here is that they should not have been omitted.
30 Horner et al, above n 25, at 170.
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WK v SR (1997)
In the second case, WK v SR,31 the Full Court allowed an appeal from a trial
judgment that found that the father had sexually abused the two children. A
successful ground of appeal was that the trial judge had drawn impermissible
inferences from the evidence of a step-daughter of the father, to the effect that
the father had behaved improperly towards her. If the Full Court had merely
said that this evidence was not a proper basis for the finding, having regard to
the Briginshaw guideline, the decision would be unremarkable. But the Full
Court’s reasoning, in the single unanimous judgment, went further than this.
First, the judgment embarked on a fairly detailed review of ‘similar fact’
evidence, although the court itself seemed to accept that that body of law
applied only to criminal proceedings.32 Fogarty criticises this aspect of the
judgment, and I agree that the discussion is a little confusing about the
relevance of the ‘similar fact’ principle in civil proceedings. Perhaps the Full
Court intended only to use the ‘similar fact’ cases to illustrate the low
probative value of the evidence of the witness in the particular case.
Second, the Full Court said this:
It is clear therefore, that a finding that abuse has occurred can only be reached by a
strict application of the onus of proof as set out in Briginshaw . . . [The Full Court
then quoted s 140 and continued]
In children’s matters under Pt VII of the Family Law Act, where the issue is a
child’s contact or residence with a significant person in his or her life, the grave
consequences of a finding of sexual abuse cannot be overstated. Accordingly, before
trial judges find themselves impelled to make a positive finding of sexual abuse, as
opposed to a finding of unacceptable risk, the standard of proof they are required to
apply must be towards the strictest end of the civil spectrum as set out in Briginshaw
and s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or
indirect inferences are insufficient to ground a finding of abuse.33
The language (‘the grave consequences of a finding of sexual abuse cannot be
overstated’; ‘the strictest end of the civil spectrum’) raises the question
whether the court intended to create some special standard of proof applicable
to findings that a person had abused a child. Commenting on this case, Fogarty
writes:
The fact is that in these cases sometimes the court has to weigh up the respective
risks of two possible errors: a false finding that there has been sexual abuse, and a
false finding that there has not been sexual abuse. Each, of course, is likely to have
serious adverse consequences. However the nature and degree of those
consequences will vary enormously from one case to another. It is a mistake for the
Full Court to state the problem in a way that suggests that the adverse consequences
of one wrong conclusion — a false finding that there has been sexual abuse (when
the child has actually not been abused) — are necessarily more damaging than those
of the other wrong conclusion — a false finding that there has not been sexual abuse
(when in fact the child was abused).
This important point is also relevant to the next case, Re W.
31 WK v SR (1997) 22 Fam LR 592; (1997) FLC 92-787 at [47] per Baker, Kay and Morgan JJ.
32 Ibid, at [54]–[56].
33 Ibid, at [46]–[47] per Baker, Kay and Morgan JJ.
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Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004)
Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof)34 is the third and final decision in the
series. In this case the Full Court again allowed an appeal from a decision that
involved a finding that the father had abused the child.35 In its single
judgment, the Full Court quoted from WK v SR, referring to ‘the very high
standard by which a court needs to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities
that something has actually occurred’, and implicitly criticised the trial Judge
for not paying attention to it.36
The Full Court then expanded on the ‘disastrous’ consequences of a false
finding of abuse, and the termination of a child’s relationship with a parent:
In setting out those authorities it does not appear that his Honour paid any
attention to the views of the Full Court in WK v SR where the court emphasised the
very high standard by which a court needs to be satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that something has actually occurred. Unless such a rigorous approach
is taken, where the often-inevitable result of a positive finding is a cessation of the
relationship between parent and child, there is a major risk of inflicting upon the
parent and child the disastrous effects of a positive finding that is reached in error.
The termination of a worthwhile relationship between the parent and child ought
in most cases be the course of last resort. The court should not shy away from
reaching such a result in an appropriate case but at all times judges should be
conscious that the adversarial or inquisitorial systems often reach results that are
artificial. The truth does not always come out. A false negative finding accompanied
by appropriate safeguards as to the future relationship between parent and child,
such as adequate supervision to guard against possible abuse, may be far less
disastrous for the child than an erroneous positive finding that leads to a cessation
of the parent-child relationship. The court needs to be remain conscious of this
imperfection at all times.37
The Full Court then quoted substantial passages from Kay J’s dissenting
judgment in K v B, including passages from the Horner article, and continued:
The lessons to be learned have not changed. The risk that the court will find heinous
behaviour when none has occurred needs to be born in mind at all times. The harm
and injustice that flows to both parent and child from an erroneous positive is almost
too horrible to contemplate.38
Fogarty criticises these passages. He asks whether the Full Court is implying
in the first sentence that there has been no relevant research since 1991, the
date of the article. He notes that the passage exhibits overwhelming concern
about an incorrect finding of abuse, and comments:
The gravity of such consequences has always been acknowledged. But to start with
an entrenched view that the consequences ‘cannot be overstated’ or are ‘too horrible
to contemplate’ warps the process explained by the High Court.
It is indeed hard to reconcile this language with a careful balancing of the
consequences of false positive and false negative findings about child abuse;
34 Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; FLC 93-192 per Kay, Holden
and O’Ryan JJ.
35 The decision is criticised at some length by Fogarty, above n 2, at 280–7.
36 (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; (2004) FLC 93-192 at [18].
37 Ibid, at [18]–[19].
38 Ibid, at [21].
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and I agree with Fogarty that such a balancing is what the High Court’s
decision requires. With hindsight, it can be seen as regrettable that the Full
Court did not give more careful consideration to the accuracy of Kay J’s
summary of the Horner article and the appropriateness of relying on that
article: had it done so, it would surely have become aware of the problems
later identified by Brown J, and briefly summarised above.
The Re W decisions criticised
As we have seen, the Re W line of cases urges a very strict approach to
findings of sexual abuse and focuses on the terrible consequences of a false
positive finding. Fogarty’s criticism was, in substance, that although this is
important, it should not be given such importance that the court fails to review
and weigh up all the relevant factors, including the consequences of making
a false negative finding, or of making no finding: ‘to start with an entrenched
view that the consequences “cannot be overstated” or are “too horrible to
contemplate” warps the process explained by the High Court’.
The Fogarty critique of what he calls ‘hyperbole’ is these passages raises
the question whether the Re W cases involve an impermissible departure from
the High Court ruling, by formulating some test even higher or stricter than
Briginshaw. My own view is that the rulings are intended as applications of
the Briginshaw test to the specific context of determinations that a child has
been sexually abused. They focus especially on the gravity of the
consequences, especially on the negative impact for the child of a loss of a
relationship with a parent (the father, in the cases). Although most of the
discussion relates to the potential harm to the child, it is reasonable to assume
that the Full Court was also very conscious of the terrible distress that such a
finding would cause to the person accused of abuse where the person was, in
fact, innocent of the abuse. Because the High Court did not need to engage in
a detailed discussion of these matters, I am not sure that the Re W cases are
necessarily inconsistent with M v M. The Full Court is entitled to give trial
judges guidance on such matters.
Nevertheless, I think there is substance in the criticism that the Re W
statements are unbalanced and overstated, and that they might discourage trial
judges from making a careful and considered decision about whether to make
a finding. Trial judges might be tempted to think that if the consequences of
a false finding ‘cannot be overstated’ or are ‘almost too horrible to
contemplate’, the Full Court is in effect telling them never to make such a
finding.
It would be mistaken and worrying if trial judges did understand the Full
Court decisions in that way. A finding that a parent has not abused a child, or
a refusal to make a findings, will also have a lot of consequences: for the
person, for the child, and for other people involved. Think of the impact of a
negative finding, or even the refusal to make a finding, on a child who has had
the courage to disclose sexual abuse. How would it feel to be such a child,
being required to have contact (supervised or otherwise) with the abusive
parent? What lessons will the child learn from such an outcome? How would
it affect the child’s relationship with an appropriately protective parent? If a
parent has indeed abused a child, the lack of a finding to that effect might
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suggest that the parent can get away with similar conduct in the future.39
Similarly, there would be impacts on other family members, for example a
parent or relative who had rightly believed the child and had sought to protect
the child, if the court declined to make a finding of abuse where the child had
in fact been abused. As Hardie Boys J once said:
It would of course be a terrible thing for the children if I were to entirely reject their
allegations, and order their lives on the basis that there was no substance in them,
and yet in fact for them to be true.40
Fortunately, it has been widely recognised that these cases require a careful
balancing of considerations, not just a preoccupation to avoid false positive
findings. Brown J once remarked, in relation to the Re W line of decisions:
With respect to the Full Court, one might as well say that the harm and injustice that
flows to a child from an erroneous negative finding is almost too horrible to
contemplate, that harm including repeated sexual abuse of the child. Nevertheless,
I am bound by the exposition of principle in the judgment.41
To similar effect, here is the NZ Court of Appeal:
The matter is somewhat more complex. The reality is that child sexual abuse is often
as difficult to prove as it is difficult to refute . . . At the same time it must be borne
in mind that false accusations or total fabrications of child sex abuse are regarded by
many experienced child psychologists and psychiatrists as being somewhat rare . . .
This does not mean, of course, that allegations of sexual abuse are to be approached
on the basis that they are true or likely to be true. Indeed, it is recognised that a
relatively small but significant percentage are likely to be false. The point merely
serves to demonstrate the difficulty of reaching a firm conclusion as to whether
sexual abuse has or has not occurred and the necessity to proceed with great care and
caution before either finding that such allegations have been established or finding
that they are without foundation . . .42
Similarly Professor Ian Freckelton has written:
The most pressing difficulty in the aftermath of these decisions is whether the bar has
now been set at too high a level for findings of sexual abuse by the Family Court or
at least that a child in particular circumstances will be placed at unacceptable risk by
way of either residence or contact. The reality is that evidence about whether a child
has been sexually abused is frequently the product of inferences and clinical
assessments that are not fully complete and which are amenable to different
interpretations. While it is undeniable that false positive findings by the court wreak
dreadful suffering for family units, it is important too that the need to minimise false
positive findings not come at the cost of an unacceptable number of false negative
findings; these too have the most serious consequences.43
39 See the discussion by Fogarty, above n 2, of Napier v Hepburn (2006) 36 Fam LR 395 in
‘An unusual case’ (2007) 19(4) Australian Family Lawyer.
40 Gooch v Gooch (High Court, Christchurch M 156/82, 22 April 1983, at 28), cited by Fogarty
J in N and S (1995) 19 Fam LR 859; (1995) FLC 82,713.
41 McCoy v Wessex (2007) 38 Fam LR 513; [2007] FamCA 489 at [33] per Brown J.
42 S v S [1993] NZFLR 657, Thomas J, quoted by Fogarty J in N and S (I have omitted some
references to the social science literature because they are now somewhat dated).
43 ‘Evidence in the Family Court: The New Regime’ (2005) 12 Psychiatry, Psychology and the
Law 234, quoted by Fogarty, above n 2, at 267.
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In short, both false positive and false negative findings are likely to have
profound consequences for the child and for other family members, and it is
wrong to focus only on the harmful consequences of false positive findings (as
the three Re W cases tend to do), and ignore the harmful consequences of false
negative findings. The nature of that balancing process will be considered
later.
Other significant Full Court decisions
Before returning to the issues raised by the Re W decisions and John Fogarty’s
critique, it is appropriate to review some other Full Court decisions, of which
the most important, for present purposes, are Potter v Potter and Johnson and
Page.
Potter v Potter (2007)
Potter v Potter44 was an unusual case. The parties conceded that the child had
been sexually abused by someone, and the trial judge narrowed down the
possible abusers to the father and the maternal grandfather. Her Honour went
on to conclude that unsupervised contact with the father would expose the
child to an unacceptable risk. The Full Court upheld the finding that the child
was abused (that finding being based on the concessions), but found that the
trial Judge’s conclusion about unacceptable risk was against the weight of
evidence and could not be upheld. It ordered a rehearing. This was a case in
which there were no specific allegations or evidence about what constituted
the sexual abuse (much of the relevant evidence was about the child exhibiting
sexualised behaviour). The Full Court pointed out that the trial Judge did not
make any finding to the effect that the father was the more likely of the two
to have been the abuser. The Full Court referred to the now-familiar quotations
in Re W and WK v SR in connection with the proof of sexual abuse, and briefly
stated the test as follows:
A finding that abuse has occurred can only be reached by a strict application of the
onus of proof as set out in Briginshaw and s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
It is interesting that the Full Court treated the authorities as applicable to the
determination of whether the child had been abused by someone. This seems
odd, since the ‘disastrous’ effects mentioned in those cases referred to findings
that the child had been abused by a particular person (the father, in each case).
If there is some kind of sliding scale, depending on the awfulness of the
consequences, as Re W and WK v SR seem to suggest, I would have thought
a finding that the child had been abused by someone would be at a different
point on the scale than a finding that a child had been abused by the child’s
father.
44 Potter v Potter (2007) 37 Fam LR 208; (2007) FLC 93-326; [2007] FamCA 350 per
Bryant CJ, Coleman and May JJ.
14 (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 21 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Mar 22 14:30:58 2011
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol25pt1/part_1
Johnson and Page (2007)
In Johnson and Page,45 the trial Judge had made orders for the father to have
unsupervised time with the child, having found that such orders would not
expose the child to an unacceptable risk of child abuse. The mother appealed,
seeking that the father should spend no time with the child. The Full Court
dismissed the appeal (except in relation to an order restraining the mother’s
partner from certain activities with the child).
The trial Judge had explicitly found that there was some risk that
unsupervised time with the father might expose the child to abuse, but it was
not an unacceptable risk. Since the judgment was upheld, this case is clear
authority that there is a difference between some risk and an unacceptable risk.
The most interesting point in the appeal for present purposes is that the
appellant mother argued, in substance, that the trial Judge had been misled by
Re W (which the mother argued was wrongly decided) into applying the
Briginshaw test to the question whether there was an unacceptable risk. The
Full Court did not agree that the trial Judge had made this error, and confirmed
that the question of unacceptable risk is to be determined according to the
ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities. It pointed out that Re W
was a decision about determinations of past sexual abuse, not about
determinations of whether certain orders would expose the child to an
unacceptable risk.46 The Full Court made the following firm and lucid
distinction between the two matters:
The onus of proof is not in doubt. It is the civil standard in accordance with s 140
of the Evidence Act. The evidence necessary to satisfy a finding of actual sexual
abuse, as distinct from unacceptable risk, is accommodated by s 140(2)(c).
The Full Court said it ‘generally agreed’ with a seven point summary of
principles stated by John Fogarty. To avoid repetition, I will quote these
principles later.47
Finally, it is interesting that the Full Court included an extensive quotation
from Fogarty J’s dissenting judgment in N and S, some of which is quoted
elsewhere in this article. It is possible that Johnson and Page indicates a
departure from the extreme language in decisions such as Re W, and points
towards a more balanced and thorough consideration of the difficult decisions
that these cases require. If this was the Full Court’s intention, however, it is a
pity it was not made explicit.
Other decisions
For completeness, I mention some decisions that need not be discussed in
detail. In N and S,48 the Full Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment that
provided access, the majority holding that the trial Judge had dismissed any
unacceptable risk. It is not fruitful for present purposes to discuss this
45 Johnson and Page (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] Fam CA 1235 per May, Boland and
Stevenson JJ.
46 Ibid, at [76].
47 The Full Court refrained from making any comment about Fogarty’s critique of the Re W
cases.
48 In the Marriage of N and S (1995) 19 Fam LR 859; (1995) FLC 82,713.
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complexities of this case, as much depends on an interpretation of the trial
judgment.49 In Fitzpatrick v Fitzpatrick (2005)50 both the trial Judge and the
Full Court took an orthodox approach to the principles, and I leave readers to
form their own views on whether, as John Fogarty suggests, the Full Court in
effect substituted its own views for those of the trial Judge.
Vasser-Taylor51 is an unremarkable orthodox decision, consistent with
Briginshaw, the Full Court upholding an appeal for lack of adequate reasons.
Two points deserve mention, however. First, the Full Court said that the
following submission ‘cogently encapsulated’ the Federal Magistrate’s task:
When allegations of abuse arise in interim proceedings, the court must weigh the
competing risks of abuse, including the risk of interrupting or severing a relationship
between a child and a parent. In order to weigh the competing risks, the court should
analyse what the risk is. To simply state that there is a risk of psychological abuse
is not providing an analysis of the risk to the child, nor does it assist in determining
what, if any, safeguards could be put in place to ameliorate the risk.52
Second, the majority appeared to approve the proposition advanced by the
Full Court in Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof) that ‘the termination of a
worthwhile relationship between a parent and child ought, in most cases, be
the course of last resort’,53 and went on to remark:
The Act assumes that the continuation of such a relationship is worthwhile if other
factors do not act to countervail that position.
Since that time, the Act has been amended, and it is now clear that the focus
is not on the relationship itself but on the benefit to the child of the
relationship.54
In ordinary situations, of course it is right to say that children benefit from
a continuing relationship with both parents, but many of the cases that come
before the family courts for final adjudication are far from ordinary, and the
court needs to determine each on its particular facts. It is worth keeping in
mind the penetrating analysis by Fogarty J in N and S:
The court must make a decision based on the facts of the particular case before
it, including the nature of the relationship between the particular child and parent
concerned. While it is of great importance to take into account the benefit to a child
of a healthy, loving, supportive relationship with a parent, where such a relationship
does not exist on the facts of the particular case, it can be of no assistance to a judge,
or the child, to idealise that the situation were different, on the basis that the majority
of parent-child relationships are of that character.
To speak of a court terminating the parent-child relationship only in ‘exceptional
circumstances’ says nothing more than that, in the majority of cases, parents
genuinely love, respect and care for their children, and seek to act in their best
49 See Fogarty, above n 2, at 274–6, and the remarks by Parkinson quoted by Fogarty, ibid, at
275.
50 (2005) 33 Fam LR 272; (2005) FLC 93-227; [2005] FamCA 394.
51 Vasser v Taylor-Black (2007) 37 Fam LR 256; (2007) FLC 93-329; [2007] FamCA 547.
52 Ibid, at [5].
53 Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249 ; (2004) FLC 93-192 ; [2004]
FamCA 768.
54 Section 60CC(2) states the first ‘primary consideration’ as ‘the benefit to the child of having
a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents’, and s 60B(1)(a) uses rather
similar language.
16 (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 23 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Mar 22 14:30:58 2011
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol25pt1/part_1
interests. It thus may be true that as a matter of sociological inquiry it would be an
‘exceptional’ case in which that were not the situation. But as a matter of legal
principle, in making decisions concerning the welfare of a particular child, it cannot
ultimately matter to that child’s welfare how parents in general relate to their
children. All that matters to that child’s welfare, in this context, is how that particular
child’s parent relates to him or her. To speak of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is to run
the risk of confusing legal principle with sociological expectations, and losing sight
of the individual case in favour of broad, non-specific ideals.55
4 Conclusions: Findings that a person has sexually
abused the child
Having reviewed these cases, we can seek to identify the current law relating
to the key issues in cases involving allegations of child abuse. We start with
the application of what has become known as the Briginshaw test in relation
to findings of abuse.
When can the court make findings of abuse: the
Briginshaw test updated
As we saw, M v M held that the determination of sexual abuse allegations is
to be ‘according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors
mentioned in Briginshaw’. The court referred to determinations that the
person who was seeking custody or access had abused the child, but the same
approach would presumably apply to the determination of such allegations
against other people, for example a step-parent or other family member.
The Briginshaw test has been somewhat reformulated, notably by the High
Court in Neat Holdings (1992):
The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil
litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so
even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other
hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance
of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus,
authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or
strict proof is necessary ‘where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found’.
Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the
standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a
conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in
fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly
make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has
been guilty of such conduct. As Dixon J commented in Briginshaw v Briginshaw:
‘The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an
occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from
a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question
whether the issue has been proved . . .’
55 In the Marriage of N and S (1995) 19 Fam LR 859 at 852.
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There are, however, circumstances in which generalisations about the need for clear
and cogent evidence to prove matters of the gravity of fraud or crime are, even when
understood as not directed to the standard of proof, likely to be unhelpful and even
misleading.56
The facts of Neat Holdings illustrate the point made in the last sentence.
The case involved allegations by each party that the other had deliberately
falsified financial figures. The High Court said that ‘the most that can be said
in such a case is that the trial judge should be conscious of the gravity of the
allegations made on both sides when reaching his or her conclusion’.57
Second, s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 now provides:
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is
satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding
whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subjectmatter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
This provision, I think, is entirely consistent with Briginshaw and Neat
Holdings. Firstly, it emphasises that there is only one standard of proof, the
balance of probabilities, although there are things to be take into account in
applying it. That is consistent with the language of M v M58 and Briginshaw,
and is the point made strongly in Neat Holdings, quoted above.
When should the court make findings of abuse?
Understanding the options and balancing the
consequences
To start with the obvious, there are often three possibilities that the court
should consider: a finding that the person has abused the child, a finding that
the person has not abused the child, and no finding either way.
There are, perhaps, two steps involved in considering whether to make a
finding that a person has sexually abused a child, although there is
considerable overlap between the two.
Step one: applying s 140 of the Evidence Act
The first step is to consider whether the evidence would justify a finding on
the balance of probabilities that the person has abused the child, having regard
to s 140. The section refers to ‘the gravity of the matters alleged’, echoing one
56 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; 67 ALJR 170;
BC9202685 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ. See also Qantas Airways Ltd
v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537; 247 ALR 273; [2008] FCAFC 69; BC200803114 at [139] per
Branson J (with whom French and Jacobson JJ agreed) (‘references to, for example, “the
Briginshaw standard” or “the onerous Briginshaw test” . . . have a tendency to lead a trier of
facts into error. The correct approach to the standard of proof in a civil proceeding in a
federal court is that for which s 140 of the Evidence Act provides.’) Cited by Brown J in
Hemiro & Sinla [2009] FamCA 181 at [43].
57 Neat Holdings (1992) 110 ALR 449; 67 ALJR 170; BC9202685 at [3].
58 See above quote: ‘according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors
mentioned in Briginshaw’.
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of the matters referred to by Dixon J in the famous statement in Briginshaw.
As to this, for the reasons advanced above, the court needs to consider not
only the grave consequences of a positive finding of abuse, but also the
consequences of a finding that there has been no abuse, and the consequences
of making no finding one way or the other. What those various consequences
will be, and how grave they will be, must of course be determined on the facts
of each case.
The section does not explicitly refer to another aspect mentioned by
Dixon J, namely, the ‘inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given
description’ but, as Odgers points out, this element was effectively endorsed
in Qantas Airways.59 No doubt sexual abuse is uncommon in families
generally, and in that sense we might say that it is inherently unlikely. But in
most cases where child sexual assault is alleged, there are statements or
behaviour by the child suggestive of sexual abuse, and, usually, a parent who
genuinely believes that the child has been or might be abused. These are
difficult areas for judges. The behaviour of children and adults in child abuse
situations may be counter-intuitive. For example, one might think that a child
who has been sexually abused would shrink from contact with the abuser.60
However I believe that child abuse experts consider that — surprising as it
may seem — children who have been sexually abused can sometimes be
strongly attached to their abusers. It may be comforting, but hardly useful in
a particular case, to have regard to the uncommonness of sexual abuse in
families generally. The court has to determine its likelihood in the
circumstances of the case, typically a most difficult task. There is a formidable
scientific literature on the incidence of sexual abuse and the likelihood that
allegations, by children and others, might be true or not;61 but assessing and
applying the insights from this literature is also a difficult task. It is easy for
non-specialists to be too easily impressed by plausible publications readily
available on the Internet, especially when the reader is not in a position to
assess the methodological soundness of the research, and may have
insufficient knowledge of the area as a whole to know whether the article is
expressing a mainstream or minority view.
Step two: considering whether to make a finding when it is
possible to do so
As we have seen, it seems clear that the High Court also contemplated a
second step, in which the court must decide whether to make or refrain from
making a finding of abuse (‘there are strong practical family reasons why the
59 S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 9th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2010, at [1.4.120], citing
Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537; 247 ALR 273; [2008] FCAFC 69;
BC200803114 (FC) at [138] per Branson J.
60 This seems to have been the assumption made by the Full Court in Re W, when it said that
the strength of the children’s wishes to be with the father should have been a ‘a further
indicator that there were serious questions as to whether the father had ever behaved
inappropriately towards them: see (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; (2004) FLC 93-192; [2004]
FamCA 768 at [41].
61 Parkinson’s 1999 article refers to some of the literature, although of course the article is now
rather dated.
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court should refrain from making a positive finding that sexual abuse has
actually taken place unless it is impelled by the particular circumstances of the
case to do so’).
This particular question did not arise in M v M, because the trial judge
considered that the evidence did not permit such a finding, and so it is not
surprising that the High Court did not expand on this sentence. What
circumstances did the High Court have in mind when it referred to a court
being ‘impelled’ to make such a finding? Did it refer to cases when the
evidence was very clear, or to cases where the evidence was very clear and
there was some other reason for making the finding? The reference to ‘strong
practical family reasons’ for refraining from making the finding seems to refer
to matters other than the degree of certainty. We can only guess what the High
Court thought such reasons might be. Suppose, however, the abuse had been
committed by a respected family member while suffering from mental illness
which has since been cured or controlled; or that some other family member
had known about the abuse but had not disclosed it. Perhaps in such
circumstances making the finding could have repercussion that might be
damaging to the children.
The High Court had previously said that the resolution of an allegation of
child abuse is ‘subservient and ancillary to the court’s determination of what
is in the best interests of the child’. It seems to follow that the court should
have regard to the child’s best interest in deciding (in cases where the evidence
permits such a finding) whether or not to make that finding.62
If the evidence supports a finding that the person has sexually abused the
child, a court should presumably consider whether it is necessary to make that
finding in order to justify the parenting orders. If it is necessary to justify the
parenting orders, then it is hard to see how the court could properly avoid
making the finding.63 This situation, however, is probably rare, because the
court will usually be able to justify the parenting orders by making a finding
about unacceptable risk.
In practice, whether to make the finding of abuse is likely to be
problematical where (i) the evidence justifies the finding, but (ii) the court
could, if it chose, justify the proposed parenting orders without making the
finding (using other factual findings to show that contact with the person
would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of abuse). In these cases, in my
view, the court needs to consider carefully whether or not to make the finding.
In favour of not making the finding is the possibility that although it passes the
civil standard, it may in fact be wrong, and a false finding that a person has
abused the child is, indeed, a terrible thing. But there are some factors that
might favour such a finding. No doubt the court would be more comfortable
making such a finding if it felt that the evidence for it not only satisfies the
requirements of s 140, but is exceptionally convincing. The court might also
consider the consequences of making the findings for various family
62 To avoid an elaborate digression, I mention that at the time of M v M the paramount
consideration principle had a more over-arching role in the legislation than it now does: see
how s 60CA is now limited to situations when the court is considering what parenting order
to make. For a detailed account, see Family Law Council, Letter of Advice on the ‘Child
Paramountcy Principle’ in the Family Law Act 1975, 2006.
63 See also Fogarty, above n 2, at 263.
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members, most obviously the impact on the child.64 It might be important, for
example, to vindicate adults who have believed the child, correctly, and have
acted to protect him or her. The child might need their protection again. There
could be various other consequences that might flow from the court’s decision
whether or not to make the finding, and in my view they should be taken
carefully into account. Indeed, in some of these cases, decisions about what to
say in the judgment, and what not to say, are more difficult to determine than
what parenting orders to make.
Summary
This has been a somewhat complex discussion, but I can state my conclusions
briefly. In sexual abuse cases the court should first consider whether it is open
to make a finding that a person has abused the child, applying the civil
standard of proof having regard to s 140. If it is, the court should then consider
whether it should do so. It may properly refrain from making the finding when
it is otherwise able to justify the proposed parenting orders, for example by
making a finding that exposure of the child to the person would expose the
child to unacceptable risk, or for other reasons would not be in the child’s
interests. In relation both to the application of the s 140 test and the choice of
making or not making an available finding, the court should carefully and
systematically consider the consequences of the decision for the child, the
parents, and others involved. The passages in the Re W decisions that
emphasise the dangers of making false positive findings of abuse should not
be allowed to distract judges from carefully weighing up all the factors
involved.
5 Exploring the ‘unacceptable risk’ test
Possible risk is not enough (the ‘lingering doubts’
problem)
In his article on Briginshaw, the former Chief Justice, the Hon Alastair
Nicholson AO, stressed that the High Court’s decision should not be taken to
mean that a mere possibility of child abuse is sufficient of itself to constitute
such an unacceptable risk. He urged, rightly in my view, that the words
‘unacceptable risk’ should be taken at face value. If this is done, he said, the
test to be applied is ‘whether, on the evidence, there is an unacceptable risk
that abuse will occur if a particular access or custody order is made’.
The reason that Nicholson was worried that the High Court decision might
be misunderstood is partly that the trial judge used the phrase ‘lingering
doubts’ to describe his level of concern. Nicholson thought that this meant the
trial Judge had, indeed, acted on a mere possibility, and worried that by
upholding the decision the High Court might be seen as endorsing that
approach. As we have seen, however, the High Court did not interpret the trial
judgment in this way.
64 Because s 60CA does not apply to decisions other than what parenting orders to make, the
paramount consideration principle probably does not strictly apply, but the child’s best
interests would always be an important and often overwhelming consideration.
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Whatever might be thought about the correct interpretation of the trial
judgment in M v M, everyone agreed on the important point, namely, that the
mere possibility of abuse is not equivalent to a finding of unacceptable risk.
It follows that it is best to forget about the phrase ‘lingering doubts’, because
taken out of context, the phrase might suggest that it is enough to say that the
judge cannot exclude all possibility of abuse, which is not the law. The risk
must be ‘unacceptable’.
Understanding the term ‘unacceptable risk’
We saw that the High Court considered earlier attempts to describe the risk
were unsatisfactory. In his article, Nicholson said that the High Court, by
using the phrase ‘unacceptable risk’, had done precisely what it had criticised,
namely, to strive for a greater degree of definition than the subject permits.
It seems to me, however, that the High Court’s phrase is particularly
important precisely because it does not attempt to quantify the matters
involved, or to suggest that the court should lean one way or another. As John
Fogarty nicely put it:
The advantage of the phrase ‘unacceptable risk’ is that it is calibrated to the nature
and degree of the risk, so that it can be adapted to the particular case, whereas words
such as ‘serious’, ‘real’, etc may suggest a fixed standard into which the case must
be placed.65
If we reflect on what is involved, I think it can be seen that this is wise.
The High Court indicated quite succinctly but precisely what is involved:
achieving ‘a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual
abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access’. Alastair
Nicholson helpfully indicated the nature of the exercise when he wrote that in
making an assessment of whether there was an unacceptable risk, judges
should ‘be mindful of the dire consequences involved in permanently
depriving a parent of contact with the child from the child’s point of view,
while at the same time balancing the devastating effect upon the child of
sexual or other forms of abuse occurring.’66 There are many other ways of
stating this point, and one can find numerous examples in the cases and in the
secondary literature, but I do not think it would be particularly helpful to
review them.
One reason that people might be troubled by the word ‘unacceptable’ is that
it could be seen as open-ended and vague. They might ask, ‘unacceptable to
whom? How is it to be determined what is acceptable and what is not?’
Such questions are, however, easily answered when one considers the
legislative context. As the High Court emphasised, the fundamental principle
is the paramountcy of the child’s best interests. Thus, the relevant matters are
to be assessed according to what the court thinks is likely to be best for the
child. Considering this, the big point that the High Court makes is, perhaps,
the same point that Alistair Nicholson stressed, namely, that the mere
possibility of abuse cannot of itself lead to a conclusion that there should be
no access. Indeed, as a matter of principle, no single factor can ever of itself
65 Fogarty, above n 2, at 253.
66 Nicholson, above n 12, at 3.
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lead to any conclusion about what parenting order should be made.
Because of this, and because the word ‘unacceptable’ refers back to this
fundamental principle, it is quite possible to state the law in a way that is
entirely consistent with the High Court’s reasoning without actually using the
word ‘unacceptable’.67 The High Court might just as well have used such
words as the following: ‘In determining whether to make an order for access
(or any other parenting order) the court must weigh up the risk that the child
might be harmed by being abused against the risk that the child might be
harmed by lack of contact with the other parent.’
The balancing exercise involved
I want to say a little more about the weighing or balancing exercise involved
in applying the ‘unacceptable risk’ test. First and foremost: one should not
read M v M as suggesting that the ultimate decision about parenting orders will
necessarily reflect only the balancing of the two factors mentioned. Other
matters relating to the child’s best interests will come into play. It may well be,
of course, that assessing the risk of abuse against the risk of detriment from
a separation from a parent will in many cases be the overwhelmingly
important matter to be determined. But of course the court will have to
consider everything relevant to the child’s best interests.68
To take a simple example, suppose that the parent against whom the
allegations of sexual abuse have been made has a history of substance abuse
or mental illness, and there is evidence that this has compromised the parent’s
ability to attend to the children’s needs. These factors might lead the court to
decide, in the light of all the circumstances, that it would not be in the child’s
interest to spend time with that parent, regardless of the sexual abuse
allegations. As the High Court put it:
[Even if the risk of abuse is less in the case of an order for supervised access] there
may be a risk of disturbance to a child who is compulsorily brought into contact with
a parent who has sexually abused her or whom the child believes to have sexually
abused her. . . .
Take a case where the court considers that there is at least some risk that the
order in question — assume it is unsupervised time with the child — might
expose the child to sexual abuse by a father. It needs to weigh up the likely
harm to the child of separation from the parent (if the time with the father is
refused) and of sexual abuse (if time with the father is permitted). As John
Fogarty has been at pains to point out, in this and many other contexts
assessing risk involves two elements: the likelihood and the amount of harm
or damage.69 We let a toddler take the risk of falling over on the domestic
carpet, though that will happen frequently: we would not dream of letting the
toddler take the risk of being run over by a car in the street, though that might
67 This is partly because the term is a tautology — the court should not order custody or access
where the risk of abuse is such that the court should not order custody or access: see
R Chisholm, ‘Child Sexual Abuse: The High Court Rules on Onus of Proof’ (1989) 3 AJFL
184.
68 Parkinson’s discussion about these matters in the 1999 article is illuminating and
wide-ranging.
69 Fogarty, above n 2, especially at 254ff.
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be very unlikely. Therefore in these cases of risk of child abuse, in relation to
each risk, we need to think about the likelihood of the harm occurring, and the
extent of the harm if it did occur.
As to likelihood, it can be assumed that in most of these cases there will be
a low likelihood of abuse if time with the father is permitted, and a high
likelihood that if time with the father is not permitted, the child will suffer the
harm of being separated from a parent. If there were a 50:50 chance that the
child would be sexually abused, it would be unthinkable that a court would
take such a risk, since the likely harm from being abused would be much
greater than the likely harm from having a period of no contact with the
parent. Similarly, if on the facts the child would have no benefit, or minimal
benefit, from contact with the other parent, a very small risk of abuse would
clearly outweigh that minimal benefit.
The toughest cases are those where there is a low likelihood of abuse, and
the child is likely to suffer considerable harm from separation from the parent.
In these cases the determination of whether time with the parent should be
allowed, by applying the ‘unacceptable risk’ test, will be agonisingly difficult.
The court will have to examine the evidence very carefully, and attempt to
quantify both aspects of risk in the particular case. How likely is the harm?
How severe would be the harm if it happened?
Fact-finding is the basis of risk assessment
A number of commentators have warned against treating ‘unacceptable risk’
as a sort of incantation, a phrase that automatically justifies an order
terminating or restricting contact. Thus Fogarty J has said:
One of the difficulties which arises in the application of these principles is in seeking
to preserve an independent content to the notion of ‘unacceptable risk’. Though the
purpose behind the notion is to assist a court in determining what is in the child’s
best interests, the importance of asking the question separately lies in its specific
guidance to courts faced with the difficulties which cases of sexual abuse raise.
There is a danger that it will be treated just as an expression which must be ritually
used in judgments which involve questions of sexual abuse, but given no substantive
meaning or weight. It is easy to say that there is or is not an unacceptable risk of
sexual abuse, and so to be seen to be applying the correct legal test. Those words
seem sometimes to be used without an appropriate degree of consideration.70
This warning is wise. Applying the test means plunging deeply into the
evidence. Making findings of fact is essential to the task of assessing what the
risk is. The court cannot make statements about risk at large, without any
factual basis.71 For this reason, I have some reservation about statements such
as the following:
70 In the Marriage of N and S (1995) 19 Fam LR 859; FLC 82,713. This passage was adopted
by the Full Court in Johnson, discussed above.
71 As the Full Court has said, ‘a finding of unacceptable risk must be based on more than
conjecture’: Orwell & Watson [2008] FamCAFC 62; BC200850122 at [74].
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It is not necessary in the assessment of risk to take into account only components
which are proved. The court is entitled to take into account factors which are not
proved but which nevertheless raise issues of concern (John Fogarty).72
Neither the existence of the risk in the future nor the alleged sexual misconduct
in the past or other risk indicators have to be established as probabilities. It is enough
that either or both are merely possible.73 Thus, probable offending in the past can
sustain a possible risk in the future or, alternatively possible past behaviour may
support a probable future risk finding. In either case the risk can be legitimately
characterised as an unacceptable one and justify the revocation of contact (Carmody
J).74
I find these passages a little difficult (perhaps I have misunderstood them). It
seems to me that the factors that raise concern must be proved on the
evidence. A judge could surely not make a finding of unacceptable risk based
on suspicion that has no basis. Take the nice analogy discussed by Fogarty: if,
in war-time, there are six unconfirmed air-raid warnings, it is sensible to take
precautions such as going into a bomb shelter, even though none of the
warnings is confirmed (maybe the siren is malfunctioning). My point,
however, is that on this analogy there would have to be proof that the air-raid
sirens went off. Similarly, in child sexual abuse cases, the finding of
unacceptable risk would necessarily be based on a whole set of factual
findings about the child and much else; those findings would have to be based
on evidence, or agreed facts.
6 Conclusions — Back to basics
Where does all this leave us? I think the best place to start with a summary of
the present law in Johnson, in which the Full Court specifically endorsed75 the
following seven-point summary by John Fogarty:
1 The decisive issue is and always remains the best interests of that child. All
other issues are subservient.
2 The nature of the risk is best expressed by the term ‘unacceptable risk’. It is
an evaluation of the nature and degree of the risk and whether, with or
without safeguards, it is acceptable.
3 Where past abuse of a child is alleged it is usually neither necessary nor
desirable to reach a definitive conclusion on that issue. Where, however, that
is done the Briginshaw civil standard of proof applies.
4 The circumstance, if it be so, that the allegation of past abuse is not proved
in accordance with Briginshaw, does not impede reliance upon those
circumstances in determining whether there is an unacceptable risk.
5 The concentration in these cases should normally be upon the question
whether there is an unacceptable risk to the child.
6 The onus of proof in reaching that conclusion is the ordinary civil standard.
72 Fogarty, above n 2, at 275, discussing N and S and Separate Representative (1995) 129 FLR
243; 19 Fam LR 837; (1996) FLC 92-655.
73 With respect, in my view, for the reasons advanced earlier in this article, this statement is not
consistent with M v M, since it treats a possible risk as equivalent to an unacceptable risk.
74 J Carmody, ‘Removing Obstacles to Justice in Family Court Sex Abuse Cases’, March 2005,
4th World Congress on Family & Child Rights; quoted by Fogarty, above n 2, at 274–6.
75 Johnson (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 at [68].
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7 But the components which go to make up that conclusion need not each be
established on the balance of probabilities. The court may reach a conclusion
of unacceptable risk from the accumulation of factors, none or some only of
which, are proved to that standard.
The Full Court added, in relation to the last paragraph:
We assume point seven of that summary is directed to the requisite standard of
proof. We think a Judge may be cautious in coming to a finding of unacceptable risk
if none, rather than some only, of the accumulation of factors considered, satisfy the
standard of proof (but see Malec v J C Hutton Proprietary Limited (1990) 169 CLR
638).
The point here, I think, is that unacceptable risk is a prediction of the future,
based on findings of fact. The confidence one will have in the prediction will
be, in part, a reflection of the confidence one has in the factual findings that
base the prediction. The decision cited, Malec, contains a short but interesting
discussion of the approach to making predictions (in that case, relating to the
future impact of injury in a damages action) as distinct making findings about
past facts.
In relation to para 4, as the Full Court pointed out in Johnson, the position
relating to the burden of proof for findings that a person has abused a child has
been modified, the early reference to Briginshaw now being a reference to
s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995.
The principles as stated in Johnson provide a more balanced and more
authoritative guide than the language in the Re W cases to the effect that the
consequences of a false positive finding ‘cannot be overstated’, and I suggest
that such statements cannot now be taken as representing the law. We don’t yet
have a substantial Full Court discussion of the way the court might weigh up
various considerations in deciding whether to make a finding of abuse in
circumstances where that is open on the evidence. However I have suggested
that in considering this, the court would be entitled to look at all aspects,
especially those relevant to the child’s best interests — and in this respect a
continuing involvement of the other parent, while of course very important,
would not be the only factor to be considered. Although the amendments of
2006 gave renewed emphasis to the benefits to children of a relationship with
both parents, there is no reason to think that the need to protect children is any
less than it ever was, as Brown J has pointed out.76
Ultimately the court must try to work out what is in the best interests of the
particular child, and in cases where there are allegations of child abuse, the
challenging tasks include not only what parenting orders to make but whether
to make positive or negative findings about the abuse allegations. The decision
in Johnson may be seen as answering John Fogarty’s call for a ‘return to
basics’. It does not make these decisions any easier — they are inevitably full
of difficulty and anguish — but it does help guide practitioners and trial judges
to what the High Court surely intended, namely, a careful and balanced
assessment of all the options, and all the relevant factors, when preparing
judgments and making orders about the best interests of children.
76 McCoy v Wessex (2007) 38 Fam LR 513; [2007] FamCa 489. Interestingly, the protection of
children from violence and abuse would be given ‘greater weight’ under the Family Law
Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010, released for consultation in November 2010: see
Item 17, adding new (2A) to s 60CC.
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Appendix
Extract from Hemiro v Sinla [2009] FAMCA 181
(Brown J, 17 March 2009)77
At [20], her Honour quoted at length from her previous decision Hartford v
Ansilda [2009] FamCA 23; BC200950161 at [23]–[25], as follows:
The Full Court [in Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof)] then referred with
approval to the dissenting judgment of Kay J in K v B (1994) FLC 92-478 where his
Honour said, at 80,972:
In cases of alleged sexual abuse, there is a significant risk that the ultimate
effect of orders to be made by the court, and of the proper operation of the
legal system, will be overlooked in the court’s anxiety to ensure that the risks
of sexual interference are minimised. Where the evidence of sexual abuse
consists of ambiguous statements of a pre-kindergarten aged child coupled
with perceived but possibly otherwise explicable behavioural changes, it is
almost impossible for the party denying any impropriety to prove that party’s
position.
In an article entitled ‘Prediction, Prevention and Clinical Expertise in Child
Custody Cases In Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been
Made’, appearing in Volume XXVI No 2 Summer 1992 Family Law
Quarterly (Publication American Bar Association Section of Family Law), at
p 170, it was observed:
Unfortunately the magnetising force of the simple allegation of a
heinous event such as child sexual abuse, which legitimately invokes
consideration of the possibility of that event, draw the clinician — and
perhaps even judges and jurors as well, . . . away from what ought
always to be the starting point of her or his evaluation enquiries,
which is that the event did not (or very highly probably did not) occur.
Because the null hypothesis (and, correlatively the absence of an
event) cannot be proved, in their testimonies concerning possibilities
of alleged events, clinicians strongly resist exonerating the targets of
their evaluation. Because it is always possible that a given individual
— even one randomly drawn from the general or a specific population
— has sexually molested a child, an inconvertible proof that the
individual has not molested a child is impossible. (emphasis in
original)
The article concerns itself with research carried out at the University of
Michigan. Case notes concerning the possible sexual abuse of a three year
old child were provided to 8 senior clinical psychologists, 23 graduate
students undergoing clinical training in psychology and 50 members of staff
of child guidance clinics including social workers, clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists all specialising in child development in areas of child mental
health. They were asked individually and then in groups to evaluate the
probabilities that sexual abuse had occurred and then to recommend what if
any ongoing child/father contact should take place.
The range of opinion on whether there had been abuse was so wide that
the authors concluded as follows:
77 Paras [23]–[44]. The quoted part of the Hemiro judgment, contained in [20], is in fact an
extended extract from Brown J’s previous decision Hartford and Ansilda [2009] FamCA 23.
See to the same effect Davidson v Davidson [2010] FAMCA 5; BC201050002 per Brown J.
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The most striking feature of these studies’ findings is the extremely
large range across experienced and non-experienced clinicians of
estimates concerning the likelihood that M was sexually abused by her
father. When given all of the relevant facts of the case, child experts
and trainees varied greatly in their individual judgment. . . These
findings lend strong support for the view that individual experts can
provide courts little if any assurance that they are able to provide even
crudely reasonable (ie objective) estimates of likelihood that child
sexual abuse has occurred or will occur, when they are confronted
with the same set of ambiguities faced by the courts in these cases.
In Re W, the Full Court concluded its analysis of the relevant legal principles by
remarking, at 79,218:
The lessons to be learned have not changed. The risk that the Court will find
heinous behaviour where none has occurred needs be borne in mind at all
times. The harm and injustice that flows to both parent and child from an
erroneous positive is almost too horrible to contemplate. . . .
As I have observed before, and with respect to the Full Court, one might as well
say that the harm and injustice that flows to both parent and child from an erroneous
negative finding is almost too horrible to contemplate, that harm including repeated
sexual abuse of a child. Nevertheless, I am bound by the exposition of principle in
the judgment . . .
(Her Honour then discussed W v W (Abuse allegations; unacceptable risk)
(2005) 34 Fam LR 129; (2005) FLC 93-235; [2005] FamCA 892. The
judgment in Hemiro v Sinla then resumes at [21]–[44]:
W v W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) (2005) FLC 93-235 was delivered
after Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof) (2004) FLC 93-192 and made no reference
to the null hypothesis advanced in the article quoted by Kay J in his dissenting
judgment in K v B (1994) FLC 92-478, which was endorsed by the Full Court in Re
W (Sex abuse: standard of proof). Nor was there any reference to the article in Potter
& Potter (2007) FLC 93-326 in which the Full Court endorsed the approach
described in Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof) or in the earlier decision in Napier
& Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303 in which the Full Court considered the approach to
determining whether the evidence establishes an unacceptable risk of abuse. It is
timely to say something further about that article.
Neither Kay J in K v. B nor the Full Court in Re W (Sex abuse: standard of proof)
named the authors of the article in question, nor was its sub-title stated. . .
In the introduction to Part I the authors make clear their interest in the decision
making processes that are generated under the mantle of expertise in cases of alleged
child sexual abuse. The introduction to Part II sets out its focus as the problems
inherent in attempting to reach firm conclusions about allegations of sexual contact
between young children and adults. Part III deals with the field and scope of clinical
expertise in these cases. The same case study was used in the research referred to in
all three parts.
The authors frankly state their concerns about the accuracy of expert evidence and
uncritical reliance on it and draw conclusions based on the research to which Kay
J referred. Not all their assertions are attributable to their research; for example, in
Part I they assert, at 251, that ‘(t)he contemporary preoccupation with child sexual
abuse surely has many parallels with the preoccupations of other times, such as
witchcraft and other heresies.’ While a footnote is provided (Child Abuse from Salem
to Jordan: Therapists as Culprits, 9 AUGUSTUS 7(1986)) the authors go on to
wonder how many people over the course of history have been ‘mortally persecuted
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for the alleged practice of witchcraft, but had indeed not practiced it’ and maintain
and flesh out the analogy in their concluding paragraph. Part II continues where Part
I left off, commencing with an aphorism attributed to Nietzsche: Convictions are the
greater enemies of truth than lies.
Part III of the series, which is the article referred to by Kay J, continues the
critique of the involvement of clinical experts in child sex abuse investigations. As
Kay J observed, detailed case notes concerning the possible sexual abuse of a 3 year
old child were provided to eight senior clinical psychologists, twenty-three graduate
students undergoing clinical training in psychology and fifty members of staff of
child guidance clinics, including social workers, clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists. In one phase of the study participants were able to question the
evaluating clinician who presented the case study. No participant met with the child
who was the subject of the allegation or with any parent or family member of the
child. They were neither treating experts nor forensic experts; the method involved
the presentation of extensive clinical case material by the evaluating clinician in that
case.
Participants were advised that until the allegation was made the child’s parents
maintained a good relationship and the child enjoyed a positive relationship with
each parent. When she was about 16 to 17 months old, the child began (on her
mother’s account) to exhibit behaviours resembling ones referred to in certain media
accounts as being associated with sexual abuse. They included nightmares, an
interest in and references to sexuality, occasional resistance to having her nappy
changed, an emergent negativism, protests against separation from her mother and,
once when having her nappy changed, the child saying ‘daddy hurt ‘gina’, which the
mother construed to mean the father had molested the child. The mother’s concerns
moved to a strong suspicion when she discovered a hair in the child’s nappy which,
she said, was the colour of the father’s hair, and she asserted, a pubic hair. She did
not save the hair.
An examining paediatrician discovered no physical evidence of sexual contact
and in the course of police investigations the father underwent two polygraphic
examinations, which concluded that he was being truthful when he denied any
sexual misconduct towards his daughter. The father acknowledged that his daughter
had become avoidant of nappy changes and that he sometimes had to be firm with
her during them. He corroborated the mother’s observations of increased negativism
and oppositionality. He could not explain the hair in the nappy.
Neither police nor protective services investigations substantiated the mother’s
suspicions and allegations. Following her receipt of their negative findings, the
mother contacted a clinic specialising in the diagnosis and treatment of child sexual
abuse; a therapist there stated that the child was being treated for (this is a direct
quotation from the article) ‘trauma [sic] of possible [sic] sexual abuse’. The
evaluation team at the clinic never contacted the father but recommended a course
of treatment to deal with the child’s behavioural problems, which were deemed
symptomatic of ‘some kind of abuse’.
The clinician who presented the case study to the participants in the research
exercise had been requested by a court to complete another clinical evaluation of the
allegation of abuse.
The findings of the authors in Part III could be summarised in this way.
• Expert evidence is highly imprecise and unreliable. Even if some of the
experts were ‘correct’ in their opinions, the broad spectrum of opinions
makes it very difficult to discern which of those are to be trusted.
• Estimates of the likelihood of abuse did not necessarily match the
recommendations made when asked about the contact the child should have
with the allegedly abusing father. In the authors’ words, the implication of
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this is that ‘. . .an allegation taken alone . . . has a powerful determining
effect far beyond any failure to substantiate it’ (p 165 (emphasis in original)).
• Where an expert is confronted with ambiguous and conflicting evidence, he
or she is rarely better placed than a court to assess the evidence.
The section of the article quoted by Kay J in K v B at 80,972 commences one
sentence into a paragraph. The first sentence of the quoted paragraph, which is
omitted, states:
Clinicians seem inherently averse to both the scientific standard of accepting
the null hypothesis (and, correlatively, the legal standard of presuming
innocence in the absence of incriminating proof) when adduced data are
insufficient to make its rejection defensible. (170)
The authors’ reference to the presumption of innocence is curious. Insofar as the
authors refer to the admission of expert evidence, it is to evidence adduced in civil
proceedings, not criminal proceedings. This is expressly acknowledged in their
comparison, at 170, of the ‘clinical arena’ with the ‘civil arena’ and in the
Introduction in Part I of the series. In Australia, ‘the legal standard of presuming
innocence in the absence of incriminating proof’ has no role in civil proceedings and
no role in the criminal standard of proof, which requires rather that the accused’s
guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, to achieve which the elements
(ingredients or ultimate facts) of the crime must be established by the evidence
beyond reasonable doubt; see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 141; R v Dickson [1983]
1 VR 227 at 235, Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 12. The presumption of
innocence is a vital part of the criminal law but to say an accused person is entitled
to the presumption of innocence is to say no more than that a person suspected of
or charged with a crime shall be assumed innocent unless and until his or her guilt
is proved, either by a plea of guilty or by a jury finding.
All three authors of the article hold positions at the University of Michigan in the
State of Michigan. The article quoted says nothing of the legal standard of proof (or,
indeed, burden of proof) in that State however in Part I, at 250–1, the authors note
that civil law generally accepts preponderance of evidence as the standard of proof
that a party must meet to prevail in the judicial decision making forum while
criminal culpability requires that the State meet the more stringent standard of
proffering evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A footnote, numbered 43,
notes:
Certain questions brought before the courts require that the prevailing party
meet a higher standard of proof than the usual civil standard. The
determination of paternity, the termination of parental rights, and the civil
commitment of the mentally ill, for example, all require the moving party to
meet a clear and convincing standard of proof.
The authors may be working within a system in which the standard of proof in
civil litigation is more variable than it is under Australian law and the court could
not rule out constitutional ramifications in the United States.
While this court cannot know why the first sentence of the paragraph was omitted
from the quotation in K v B, it can say that its inclusion would have caused a legally
qualified Australian reader to question the apparent analogy drawn between the null
hypothesis and the presumption of innocence, its relevance to the arguments the
authors sought to advance and the authors’ non-expert assumptions about the law.
The authors refer to the null hypothesis as ‘the scientific standard’ at 170, but say
nothing more of it. The expression was coined by Sir Ronald Fisher, an English
geneticist and statistician, in 1935; (see Fisher, RA (1966) The Design of
Experiments, 8th edition, Hafner: Edinburgh). In statistics a null hypothesis is a
concept which arises in the context of statistical hypothesis testing to describe in a
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formal way some aspect of the statistical behaviour of a set of data which is treated
as valid unless the actual behaviour of the data contradicts this assumption. Although
a null hypothesis always occurs in conjunction with an alternative hypothesis it
would be misleading to consider the alternative hypothesis as the negation of the
null hypothesis. Importantly, the absence of evidence against the null hypothesis
does not establish its ‘truth’; if the null hypothesis is not rejected there is no reason
to change decisions or procedures predicated on its truth but it allows for the
possibility of obtaining further data and then re-examining the same hypothesis. In
the article the authors appear to use it to mean an hypothesis that sexual abuse has
not occurred.
Tellingly, a clause is omitted in the midst of the paragraph quoted by Kay J. The
first sentence of the quoted paragraph is reproduced below with the omitted words
in bold:
Unfortunately, the magnetising force of the simple allegation of a heinous
event such as child sexual abuse, which legitimately invokes consideration of
the possibility of that event, draws the clinician — and perhaps even judges
and jurors as well, although the safeguards against this happening seem to
us stronger in the civil arena than in the clinical arena — away from what
ought always to be the starting point of his or her evaluation enquiries, which
is that the event did not (or very highly probably did not) occur. (170)
The omitted words, which qualify ‘perhaps even judges and jurors’, are consistent
with the authors’ statements (at 162–3) that despite their view of the imperfection of
expert evidence, ‘the findings do not mean, of course, that specialists in child mental
health cannot be useful in the fact finding process, as they may offer modes and
venues of communication that genuinely assist courts in fully weighing evidence’.
The authors describe the central problem faced by courts which use experts in cases
of alleged child sexual abuse as being:
. . . one of determining which of the diverse expert opinions one might solicit
is veridical and which expert(s) among the many who present themselves as
such in any given case can be expected and relied upon to exercise genuine
expertise rather than simple ordinary judgment. (163)
The paragraph following that quoted by Kay J is the concluding paragraph of the
article, and is in these terms:
Certainly, one important implication of our observations and findings is that
for each and every individual clinician an immense burden exists to
demonstrate convincingly to the courts to which they testify, and to society
in general (neither statements to the effect that one has seen “hundreds of
cases” nor presentations of thick resumes or curricula vitae being inherently
convincing), the grounds on which s/he can be confidently expected to
reason or predict beyond the capacity of the ordinary judge or juror when
s/he is faced with the same information. A further implication, of course, is
that courts need to examine their experts beyond the customary scope (which
is too often perfunctory) of voir dire, which in our opinion admits far more
clinicians to the realm of privileged testimony than is justified by any
reasoned appraisals that have been made of them as a class of specialists.
(170)
The authors of the article place much faith in the deductive capabilities of courts
(as opposed to ‘clinical experts’) in drawing conclusions from conflicting and
ambiguous evidence. The authors do acknowledge the ‘pragmatic utility’ in the
admission of expert evidence, however unsatisfactory (166). Their main point is that
the court should be cautious when considering expert evidence; as its sub-title makes
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clear, the article is about the formation of expert opinion, not determination of
allegations by a court. At 169, the authors make this clear when expressing this
caution:
Courts need to recognize, therefore, that the thought processes of most
clinicians, whose modes and manners of discourse may in their aplomb and
tones of unflinching conviction, appear to be authoritative, are by dint of
training and practice historically rooted in the traditionally divergent,
intuitive, and speculative thought processes of the clinical case conference,
and not in the traditionally systematic, fact-weighing thought processes of
legal discourse. Caveat curia!
The authors refer to the problematic relationship between a low assessment of
abuse and a ‘conservative’ recommendation for contact. An example given involved
a risk assessment by participants falling between 0.001 and 0.25 (mean probability:
0.11) where despite this low likelihood of abuse, several experts expressed the
opinion that contact between the father and child should be supervised as a caution.
That approach was criticised and attributed by the authors to ‘individual differences
in tolerance for risk, as well as non-expert based views of parental rights’.
As the article was not concerned with the court process, it did not take into
account the potential for such a poor correlation between a clinician’s assessment of
risk and his or her recommendation for contact to be tested in cross-examination and
the contradiction exposed. Nor did it take into account a court’s obligation to act
according to law, rather than on personal views of ‘parental rights’.
By quoting that part of Kay J’s earlier dissenting judgment which includes an
edited quotation from the article, the Full Court in Re W (Sex abuse: standard of
proof) cannot have meant to endorse an approach which would have the court take
as its starting point a premise that the sexual abuse did not, or ‘very highly probably
did not’ occur, as that would be inconsistent with s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995
(Cth) and inconsistent with decades of jurisprudence about the standard of proof in
civil cases, before and after the proclamation of the Evidence Act 1995. A revisiting
of the article, and of the series of which it forms part, leads one to wonder whether
it was considered in its entirety by Kay J in K v B. As the Full Court itself made no
reference to the article, save by quoting that part of K v B which refers to it, there
is no reason to infer that it considered the whole of the article, or the series.
On occasions, submissions made in this court suggest that some readers
extrapolate from the first paragraph of the article quoted by Kay J that the starting
point of a judge’s evaluation should be the null hypothesis. The article does not
support such a reading; nor does s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) or any of the
other authorities to which I have referred.
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